East Timor Independence

colonial nations: England, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Yet such countries

relied on mechanisms of economical domination that would last, assuring

that political independence wouldn't substantially affect the structure of

trade relations.

Loss of the Indian territories and the reactions. The first problem

that the Portuguese had to deal with was the conflict with the Indian

Union, independent state in 1947. The Indian nationalism had triumphed over

the English occupation, and in 1956 forced the French to abandon their

establishments in 1956. The same was demanded to the Portuguese over their

territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, but in face of refusal. India severed

the diplomatic relations. The passage through Indian territory in order to

reach the two enclaves dependent of Daman was denied since 1954, and

despite the recognition of such right by International Court of Justice

recognized t (1960), Dadrб and Nagar Haveli were effectively lost. This was

followed by mass invasions of passive resisters which Portuguese were still

able to hinder until December 19 of 1961, when the Indian Union made

prevail it's superior military force, to obtain final retreat of the

Portuguese.

Goa had been capital of the Portuguese expansion to the East.

Conquered in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, it was also an active center of

religious diffusion to the point of being called the Rome of the Orient. In

spite of it's the historical and spiritual importance, the reactions

against the military attack of the Indian Union parted mainly from official

sectors, and only moderately shared by the public opinion. For the

historian J. Hermano de Saraiva whom we have followed, it reflected the

dominant politic ideologies: at the end of the XIXth century, the

colonizing activity was considered a service rendered to civilization but

since World War II viewed as an attempt to the liberty of the peoples. This

“doctrinal involucre of interest to which the Portuguese were completely

strange was rapidly adopted by the intellectual groups, in great part

responsible for the formation of the public opinion”. That's how Saraiva

justifies that the protests for the loss of Goa to the Indian Union were

directed less to the foreign power than to the Portuguese authorities, “for

not having known to negotiate a modus viviendi acceptable for both parts”.

More than that, he detects in this curious reaction a tendency that would

accentuate along the two following decades: the crisis of patriotism. To

defend or to exalt the national values appeared to the bourgeois elites of

the 60's as a provincial attitude, expression of cultural under-

development.

Indonesian invasion

Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975, relying on US

diplomatic support and arms, used illegally but with secret authorisation

from Washington; new arms shipments were sent under the cover of an

official "embargo".

There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would have

sufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw active participation and

inform their associates in the Indonesian military command that the

atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self-

determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the international court

of justice. “We cannot undo the past, but should at least be willing to

recognise what we have done, and face the moral responsibility of saving

the remnants and providing reparations” - a small gesture of compensation

for terrible crimes.

Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down to

the ground. Others run to the mountains in the heart of their land, and

organized a resistance movement. These brave peasants - and their sons -

have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23 years now. Torture,

rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and psychological violations, violent

repression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere people

(the original people of East Timor) since.

Even before president Habibie's surprise call for a referendum this

year, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its control over

East Timor's resources, and undertook careful planning with "the aim, quite

simply... to destroy a nation".

The plans were known to western intelligence. The army recruited

thousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More ominously,

the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained Kopassus special

forces and, as senior military adviser, General Makarim, a US-trained

intelligence specialist with "a reputation for callous violence".

Terror and destruction began early in the year. The army forces

responsible have been described as "rogue elements" in the west. There is

good reason, however, to accept Bishop Belo's assignment of direct

responsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the militias have been

managed by elite units of Kopassus, the "crack special forces unit" that

had "been training regularly with US and Australian forces until their

behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends".

These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix programme in the

Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of peasants and much of the

indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as "the tactics employed by

the Contras" in Nicaragua. The state terrorists were "not simply going

after the most radical pro-independence people, but... the moderates, the

people who have influence in their community."

Well before the referendum, the commander of the Indonesian military

in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to come: "If the pro-

independents do win... all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23

years ago". An army document of early May, when international agreement on

the referendum was reached, ordered "massacres should be carried out from

village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-

independence supporters win". The independence movement "should be

eliminated from its leadership down to its roots".

Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources, the Australian press

reported that "hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars are

being stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is rejected at the

ballot box".

All of this was understood by Indonesia's "foreign friends", who also

knew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and ambiguous

reactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret as a "green

light" to carry out their work.

The sordid history must be viewed against the background of US-

Indonesia relations in the postwar era. The rich resources of the

archipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed it a central

role in US global planning. These factors lie behind US efforts 40 years

ago to dismantle Indonesia, perceived as too independent and too democratic

- even permitting participation of the poor peasants. These factors account

for western support for the regime of killers and torturers who emerged

from the 1965 coup.

Their achievements were seen as a vindication of Washington's wars in

Indochina, motivated in large part by concerns that the "virus" of

independent nationalism might "infect" Indonesia, to use Kissinger-like

rhetoric.

The recent convulsions inside Indonesia - with its people finally

crying for freedom and democracy - and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1996 -

shared between Bishop Belo, a dominican supporting the Maubere people in

Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, a politician and activist who represents the

Resistance historic leader, Xanana Gusmao, imprisioned in Indonesia for a

20-year sentence - have brought a new hope to the fight of this martyr

people. Also, economic crisis hitting south-east Asia has shaken the

dictatorship in Jakarta more than ever. The winds of change blowing

throughout Indonesia started to hit East Timor...

Introduction to Indonesia

Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the world which

means 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part of

the declared Muslims mix their faith in Allah with animistic or Hindu-

Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the Indian colonization that

would be interrupted with the penetration of Islam in the 16th century,

generally superficial and incomplete.

Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677 islands, 3 000

inhabited, and with an approximate extension of 1/8 the perimeter of Earth,

Indonesia faces problems of national unity. Being the fifth most populous

nation, 2/3 are concentrated in only the fifth larger island, Java, where

the density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably by birth

control and transmigration to territories such as Papua New Guinea,

recently East Timor but also in between with the evident purpose of

dissolving local cultures in the predominant Javanese which is only one

amongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different

languages and dialects.

The Dutch colonial domain had been massively based in Java, with the

rest of the archipelago had developed very unequally. From the rigid

Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes of Borneo or the Christian

islands of the east, a variety of economic and social systems experienced

very distinct problems for their progress.

Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno

At the time of Indonesia's proclamation of independence in 1945,

President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state -- the "Panca

sila" (meaning "five virtues") -- to be followed by all citizens and sworn

by the social organizations. Main principles imposed were the adoption of

Indonesian "Bahasa" language and the acceptance of one among five religions

-- Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism -- forbidding

the animist cults and other traditional practices. Thus "Panca sila" was

assumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize the

diverse cultures.

But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibility

of the creation of an official Islamic state, when Suharto reached to

power, Communist administrators and Islamic movements supported the

Revolution, but what they didn't expect was the minor concessions offered,

and once annihilated the Communist Party, an “important preoccupation of

the government has been to control, domesticate or destroy the most

orthodox and active Muslim factions” (Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhгes, Oporto

University). Since then they oftenly erupt in riots against the military

aristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.

Besides reaffirming the "Panca sila", in 1982 Suharto introduced the

Law of the Associations which would fasten the strain on political,

religious and social associations as it increased the powers of the

administration to dismiss or impute directors to the aggregations, to

destroy or agglutinate them in others more vast and controlled by the

militaries.

Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections in

favor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with the killing

of 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of former

governors that defied an inquiry to the incident.

Neo-colonialism in Indonesia? Many authors mention that Sukarno had a

dream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising the totality of the

ancient Dutch East Indies, inclusive the non-Indonesian population. For

this reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially conceived

for the creation of the United States of Indonesia -- thus betraying the

agreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty --, in favor of an

unitary constitution, although still provisional. The new direction was

taken in August of 1950, three months after an unilateral declaration of

independence by the South Moluccas.

The first elections, free and democratic in fact, would be held in

1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences naturally

brought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. On

one hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of the "Nahdatul

Ulama" (NU) and the orthodox Moslems of the "Masyumi", which's vital

strength came from the outside -- West Sumatra and North Celebes besides

Occidental Java (Sundanese ethnic origin). On the other hand, between the

Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based in Java, and

these with the Moslems.

The inefficiency of the administration, which passed through seven

governments since 1949 to '57, and the rivalry engaged by the parties

alone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th, after

all, the concentration of decision and power in Java as restrictor of the

economic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in the

exterior islands.

In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal democracy

because unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He interfered more in the

constitutional processes and appeals to his concept of "Guided Democracy",

founded on indigenous procedures: the important questions should be decided

through prolonged deliberations ("musyawarah") in order to obtain consensus

("mukafat"). This was the practice in the village and the same model ought

to be adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government formed by the

four main parties and a national council represented by parties and

functional groups in which, under the guidance of the president (himself),

consensus would express itself.

In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father of the country

and mentor of the principle "unity in diversity", he was unable to avoid

the proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response to the

regional dissidences which reached their peak.

At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat of

a motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West New

Guinea. In a series of direct actions across the country, Dutch property

was seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the beginning of

1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new central government

under the leadership of Hatta, a moderate and historic figure of the

Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years ago

when he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal of

the Sumatrese a new revolutionary government was formed, supported by

leaders of the Masyumi Party, including the ex-Prime Ministers Natsir

(September 1950 -- March '51) and Harahap (August '55 -- March '56). The

military commandant of the North Celebes joined the initiative, yet most

striking was CIA's assistance with armament including aircrafts.

Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and with

the regions undermined, the parties discredited and the prestige of the

victorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of Guided Democracy in

partnership with the military. Meanwhile, the army chief of staff A.

Nasution had committed himself to the thought that the return to the

revolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the best

means for implementing the principles of deliberation, consensus and

functional representation. Sukarno urged this course in a speech to the

Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution.

Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds for majority, he

introduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.

Indonesia's domestic as well as foreign diplomacy is difficult to

conceive in terms other than in the context of neo-colonialism. It

certainly is incompatible with the spirit of the Afro-Asian Conference of

Bandung held in Java, in 1955. Among twenty nine countries consensus was

reached in order to condemn colonialism “in all it's forms of

manifestation”. As it seems, imperialism isn't condemnable so long the

territories comes from an ancient colony. Like the annexation of the

Moluccan islands (1950-52) and in 1969 the also former Dutch West New

Guinea, long pretended. The last was integrated after an Act of Free Choice

sanctioned by UN. In truth, many journalists and observers would consider

the process orchestrated but it had already been sealed. Today it is

remembered as perhaps the most unfortunate episode UN's history.

In both regions, as well as in other islands of the Pacific,

population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not identifying themselves with

Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.

The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From the

perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in the

district of Acheh, a Moslem state practically subsisted between 1948 and

1962), Sumatra and Celebes as we've seen but also Kalimantan, to those

involving Christian groups as in the South Moluccas. Still in 1984 the

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