East Timor Independence

Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in attacks against the main

cities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to the

Regional Parliament.

The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the preservation of

the equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI). The period

assisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the consistent

protection moved by the President in face of the incursions of the

militaries. he opposed to the prohibitions of congresses and editorials,

banished political organizations patronized by the military to blacken the

PKI, placing some of their militants in political posts. Many analysts

think that Sukarno was preparing the path for the rise of the communists to

the power. Others say that his action intended to assure a the permanently

threatened equilibrium

The coup of Suharto and the military. On the night of September 30,

1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim Air Base attempted a

coup d'йtat to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over of a pro-

Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic Reserve

of the Army Forces (KOSTRAD), commanded by Suharto, had concluded a

successful counter-attack. For specialist Benedict Anderson, of Cornell

University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins of power

into his hands, hadn't been aimed at by the "30th of September Movement"

which assassinated six army generals (while a seventh, A. Nasution,

escaped).

With propaganda that implicated important nationalist and communist

politicians in the first stroke and the estimulation of the widely spread

resentment of the pro-Chinese PKI was object of among the Indonesian

Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed power. Suharto begun to

maintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional presidency,

as a symbol of national unity until by decree emptying his legal authority,

in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for more than half a

million Chinese and Indonesian besides an excess of 200 thousand political

prisoners which altogether formed one of the greatest Communist parties of

the World. The wave of hysteria was such that they were pointed out and

oftenly even executed by their proper neighbor civilians in the villages.

Formation of East-Timorese political associations

During Portuguese dictatorship, civilians were prohibited to gather

for political discussions. But since the 60's an educated elite with

nationalist aspirations begun to reune clandistinely and vehicle some

principles in catholic press. Three weeks after the democratic Revolution,

formation of political associations was incentivated, in the process of

decolonization. Immediatly UDT was founded, wanting to prolong Portugal's

presence in view of a progressive autonomy. ASDT, future Fretilin, called

for radical independence, while Apodeti, supported by Indonesia, for the

integration of East Timor in the neighbour power.

Although the changes acrossing the metropolis were of little immediate

effect in the rural society, they had profound impact among the elites of

East Timor, particularly in the administrator sectors, centered in the

cities and specially in Dili They polarized the opposition to certain

aspects of the Portuguese rule.

Since the 60s, an educated elite with nationalist aspirations began to

emerge, often product of the catholic schools and particularly from the

seminaries of Dare (outside Dili) and S. Jose in the colony of Macao.

Discussions involved small groups of students and administrators that

gathered clandestinely in the capital. The main escapes of their ideas were

catholic publications of reduced circulation like Seara, which was closed

down by the political police PIDE.

The conclusions reached are considered general and vagrant. Subjects

like traditional marriage and the educational system were debated but not

much was proposed as a global critic and alternatives.

Anyhow, this collective of student-administrators and higher level

bureaucrats, as well as important rural proprietors would constitute the

basis of the two main political parties: UDT and ASDT/Fretilin.

Three weeks after the Revolution 25th of April, the Governor of East

Timor created the Commission for the Autodetermination which's intentions

were to bring out to legality all the incipient political associations.

The parties

UDT (Timor Democratic Union). This became the first party, was also

the most popular for some months. The initial declaration, of May 11th,

made apology of democratic principles, distribution of revenues and, the

fulcral aspect, a progressive autonomy materialized with an increasing

participation of the Timorese but always in the light of the Portuguese

flag, to culminate with the integration of East Timor in a Portuguese

language community. The political platform as conceived by first president

Mбrio Carrascalгo was to hold Portugal's presence as far as possible

without putting aside the option for independence. But although having

presented a cohesive front at start, the course of events in the months

followed would evidence different susceptibilities towards a same problem.

Firmly based on two groups, the higher positioned administrator elite

and the larger proprietors of coffee plantations. UDT accounted still the

favours of many suco liurais, although the majority of these belonged to

the circle of the imposed chiefs, in an ancient practice of the colonial

government to substitute the legitimate when less malleable... They used

their influence to gain support for the party in the countryside managing

strong implantation in areas like Liquie, Maubara, Maubisse, Ainaro,

Manatuto, Laclubar.

While a group of conservatives were granted support by traditional

chiefs and administrators -- whose positions and privileges under

Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the metropolis --,

those with commercial preoccupations of economical diversification beyond

the Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence.

Not until 27 of July did the MFA in Lisbon determine the new

orientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it, the Timorese

were officially and for the first time confronted with the possibility of

independence.

In a message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about the

viability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained. Few days

later, UDT published the provisional statutes where preconized

autodetermination oriented to federation with Portugal, with an

intermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting integration

in any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement of

a definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of independence

that blew from the ancient metropolis. Spreading throughout the African

colonies, in East Timor it influenced a crescent opposing party of

independist militancy that defied UDT's hesitations: ASDT.

Amongst UDT founders pontificated the mentioned Mario Carrascalгo,

proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services, and

also former leader of caetanist party ANP (Popular National Association),

the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP member and

director of Timor's journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by the government.

He and intellectual Domingos de Oliveira were custom officials. Cesar

Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili.

ASDT/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). The

plan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it's foundation, 20th of

May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and democracy it called upfront

for a gradual independence preceded of administrator, economical, social

and political reforms. Three to eight years was the period of transition

considered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation of the

Timorese in the administration.

In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members of

the urbane elites, mainly those living in Dнli, which maintained the link

to the rural areas of where they came from. Some were even descendants of

liurai families.

With an average age under 30, the elder Xavier do Amaral, of 37,

became ASDT's chairman. The leaders were commited to nationalism and

reaffirmation of the Timorese culture, agreed on the priority of

agricultural development, on alphabetization and extensive health

programmes. But furthermore, the political perspectives deferred. The

dominating tendency between the founders of ASDT was clearly social-

democratic, represented by men like journalist Ramos-Horta, administrator

Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota and former professor Xavier do Amaral.

Ramos-Horta says that for him and the majority of his colleagues it

represented social justice, equitative distribution of the country's

wealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended democratic

liberties. As to what extent did they have a model, sociologist John G.

Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the 60 and 70's in Austria and

Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn't experimented, as the urgency to gain internal

and foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity.

Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current leaded by ancient

sergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, “combined a

fervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of economical and political

development self-reliance based upon the experiences of Angola and

Mozambique”. His ideas would begin to prevail after the transformation of

ASDT into FRETILIN.

Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). In 25 of May a

third party appeared under the designation of Association for the

Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti, the manifesto of the

party defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia in

accordance to the International Law and principles such as the obligatory

teaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education and

medical assistance, and the right to go on strike.

The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the assumption that Portugal

would abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn't stand a

chance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in a

process of integration appeared more as a popular measure and than as a

political stand.

It has been written that in the beginning of the 60's, BAKIN (military

co-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence INTEL), mounted a net in

East Timor which dealed with merchants, custom-house functionaries and

agents from the Indonesian consulate of Dili, in change of favours,

payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would become

the prominent leaders of Apodeti: professor and administrator Osуrio

Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of Indonesian Timor) Guilherme

Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo.

Still before the Portuguese Revolution, BAKIN had trained East-

timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters.

Nevertheless, while UDT and ASDT/Fretilin rapidly reached to the

thousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn't reach more than a couple of hundreds

during the whole year of '74.

The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small

Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had no expression. The dubious

personalities of it's leaders, all with criminal record and their political

purposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor's last governor, J. Lemos

Pires “an enclosed organization, with difficulties to dialogue with the

people and government even worse with the opponent parties”. Fretilin

considered Apodeti illegal.

Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA

(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning "sons of the mountain warriors", was

filiated in the Popular Monarchical Party of the metropolis. Remounting

it's origins to the Topasses (see Ethnology of the Timorese), KOTA

postulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who could trace their

ancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a democratic

monarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais. Like KOTA, the

Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn't a programme and agrouped only

eight members, all from the same family. They wished to mobilize the

working class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East Timor

in Australia received money for promises of integration in Australia. It's

existence was ephemerous because the Australian government departed from

the idea even before the end of 1974.

Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned and

precisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke that

four of the five parties, which they alleged that was the majority of the

East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War

On 15 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously

authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Timor (UNSCR

1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for its mandate: first,

to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect and support

the United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third, to facilitate within

force capabilities humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor. The

multinational force is commanded by Australia’s Major General Peter

Cosgrove

Australian support

The multinational force has been authorised by the United Nations

Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to use

all necessary measures to achieve its mandate. The multinational force

would prepare the ground for the United Nations to complete its task of

managing East Timor's transition to independence. This will involve the

arrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet UN peacekeeping

operation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration.

Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new –

Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But the East Timor operation –

multilateral in scope, strongly representing South East Asia, led by

Australia and conducted under a United Nations Chapter VII or peace

enforcement mandate – is of a very different nature. This is the first time

that Australia has been asked by the United Nations to build and lead a

multinational force and to provide the largest single component. When

Australia’s deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops.

Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is not motivated by

any desire to cause difficulties in relations between Australia and

Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor at the request

of the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian Government.

It was in Australia’s vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stable

and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and

respected role in the region. It was also in Indonesia’s own interests to

ensure East Timor’s transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australia’s

efforts in building the relations with Indonesia were directed to that

outcome.

With respect to defence relations, it is in australian security

interests to have links such as defence attache representation, high-level

strategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance and disaster

relief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the objectives in

East Timor, and are desirable because defence links will be part of any

effective long-term relationship with Indonesia. That decision shows the

challenges Jakarta and Canberra face in maintaining a working defence

relationship that supports the long-term national and strategic interests

of both countries.

Prime Minister Howard has said that “the deployment of Australian

troops to East Timor meets the test of national interest in two respects.

First, in the spirit of Australia's military tradition, troops are going to

defend what Australian society believes to be right. The troops are not

going to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others or to

act against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go to

East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement of

the Indonesian government. INTERFET troops are defending East Timor’s

desire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by the

Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international community.

In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the humanitarian relief that

is so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of displaced people

in East Timor.

Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to the

terrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the ballot

was announced. Apart from the human cost, the scale of violence we

witnessed undermines Australia's own interest in a stable region. The

troops will prepare the way for the United Nations to undertake the vital

task of developing a transitional political and administrative framework

for East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the hope of reconciliation

among groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity to

create their own future. They have a responsibility to come to grips with

these issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate on

its nation building task, with the full support of the international

community.”

USA admits Timorese right to self-determination

On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold, dated December 27th, 1996,

U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that he "noted

with interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of a UN-sponsored

self-determination referendum in East Timor".

Indonesia admits independence

For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted the right of

the Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another high-

level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese and Indonesian

Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations' headquarters in New Yourk, the

Indonesian authorities stated that if the East Timorese rejected the

current authonomy plan offered by Indonesia, the central government in

Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors.

Only a couple of weeks later, president B.J. Habibie announced, at a

meeting with indonesian businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce, that by

January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would be 'fixed': either the

Timorese accepted the "large-scale authonomy" proposed by the Indonesian

government in New York (August 5th, 1998), or Indonesia "would wave them

goodbye". It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked of

independence for East Timor.

Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has worsened in the last

months, followin the alleged massacre at Alas (south of Dili) last

December, when as much as 52 people would have been killed. The military

(18,000 soldiers currently serve in the occupied territory, according to

intelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident officer - that

is, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in the

rest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what international

observers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on the verge

of Indonesia's leave.

Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on

the Question of East Timor

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General Assembly

resolutions and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the

Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;

bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and

Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-

General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable

solution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5 August

1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General,

negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East

Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective

Governments on the final status of East Timor; having discussed a

constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a

draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian

Government; noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the

proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to

the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty

over East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an

autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of

Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from

the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending

a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people

through an act of self-determination under United Notions auspices; taking

into account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each

have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special

autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process

forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal

agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on

the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;

bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested

the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular

consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in New

York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the Agreement Between the Republic of

Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor

“Article 1 Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed

constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor

within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both

inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or

rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret

and universal ballot.

Article 2 Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the

signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East

Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.

Article 3 The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining

peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular

consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere

free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.

Article 4 Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popular

consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as

to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timorese

people.

Article 5 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result

of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that,

the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to

the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate the

constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the

constitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiate

within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East

Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General

Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of

the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 6 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result

of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the

proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to

the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the

constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus

restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July

1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-

General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of

authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall,

subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure

enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.

Article 7 During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular

consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the

parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United

Nations presence in East Timor. “

Conclusion

On August, 30th, History was written in East Timor: 98.6% of

registered voters exercised their democratic right in a UN-organised

referendum, considered by the Indonesian authorities as "free and fair".

Defying eight months of intimidation by indonesian-armed militiamen, mostly

transmigrated from West Timor, the population stood in long queues at the

ballot sites, in some cases waiting hours in the sun after walking

kilometres to the nearest polling station.

Hardly anybody partied in Dili, though, or in the rest of the

territory; celebrations were held abroad, though, in Australia, Portugal,

the United States, Ireland, England, Mozambique, even Indonesia, wherever a

Timorese community is to be found. But inside the new Nation, just four

hours after the official announcement, the defeated militia gangs started

to set East Timor on fire. BBC, CNN, and other international TV stations

broadcasted to the world images once seen in other war scenarios - fire of

automatic weapons, houses set on fire, innocent civilians seeking shelter

in the schools, the churches, the neighbouring mountains. International

media reports mentioned 145 deaths in Dili only, in the 48 hours following

the announcement. On September, 5th and 6th, most international observers,

journalists and the civilian personnel of UNAMET were evacuated from the

territory, either by chartered planes or the Australian Air Force. On the

afternoon of September, the 5th, four indonesian ministers - including

Defence and Foreign Affairs holders, General Wiranto and Mr. Ali Alatas -

and one secretary of State paid a 4-hour visit to Dili - though they never

left the airport "for security reasons".

On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered on

an emergency meeting in New York, once more abstained from sending in a

peace-keeping force. The Indonesian authorities claimed to be able to

restore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already stationed in the

territory failed to do so until now, and were even reported to have

participated, in some cases directly, in the new mass killings started on

September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence from UNAMET staff and

international media wasn't enough, so the Council decided to send a "fact-

finding mission" to Jakarta.

On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of Nobel Peace Prize

winner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in Baucau,

though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees in his frontyard,

now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like so many before them.

More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili, and

the UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport.

Despite several United Nations Resolutions on the right of the

Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized the indonesian

annexation of the territory), the international community has been blind to

the fight of its inhabitants. Only since November 12th, 1991, when more

than 250 youngsters were killed during a brutal massacre occurred in a

cematery in Dili (the capital city of East Timor), have the "civilized"

nations condemned Indonesia in a more consistent way. But words of

condemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime (a

dictatorship ruling Indonesia for decades), and strengthen the economic

ties binding European and American states to Jakarta.

The five days which mediated until official results were announced

were days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other spots

in the territory. But on the morning of September, 4th, UNAMET (United

Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian Martin announced the

results, minutes after the United Nations' Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,

had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept the

Special Autonomy offered to the territory by Indonesia, while an

overwhelming majority of 78.5% reffused it, thus laying the path to

independence.

The sources

. Aditjondro, George J In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the

Occupation of East Timor, The Netherlands, 1994

. Aubrey, Jim Free East Timor – Australia’s Culpability in East Timor’s

Genocide. Vintage – Random House Australia

. Carey, P & GC Bentley East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a

Nation, Cassell, NY, 1995

. CIIR/IPJET International Law and the Question of East Timor, London, 1995

. Cox, Steve Generations of Resistance: East Timor, Cassell, UK, 1995

. Dunn, James 1. East Timor - the Balibo Incident in Perspective, Sydney,

1995

. Timor: A People Betrayed , ABC Books, Sydney, 1996

. East Timor: No Solutions Without respect for Human Rights: Bi-Annual

Report of Human Rights Violations, January to June 1998

. Violence by the State Against Women in East Timor: A Report to the UN

Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Including its Clauses and

Consequences

. East Timorese Political Prisoners

. Breaking the Cycle of Human Rights Violations in East Timor: Annual

Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1997

. Hobart East Timor Committee Hobart East Timor Committee – Papers, 1998

Jardine, Matthew

. Ramos Horta, Jose, International Perspectives on Children of War, Family

and Conciliation Courts Review Vol 36 No 3 July 1998

. Salla, Michael E, Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict,

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 1997

. ETAN/US - Pamphlets/Reports NY,USA

. Indonesia and East Timor: On the verge of change? Charles Scheiner,

Matthew Jardine & Sidhawati ETAN, Global Exchange & Justice for All,

April 1998

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