East Timor Independence

Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975, relying on US diplomatic support and arms, used illegally but with secret authorisation from Washington; new arms shipments were sent under the cover of an official "embargo".

There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would have sufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw active participation and inform their associates in the Indonesian military command that the atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self- determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the international court of justice. “We cannot undo the past, but should at least be willing to recognise what we have done, and face the moral responsibility of saving the remnants and providing reparations” - a small gesture of compensation for terrible crimes.

Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down to the ground. Others run to the mountains in the heart of their land, and organized a resistance movement. These brave peasants - and their sons - have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23 years now. Torture, rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and psychological violations, violent repression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere people
(the original people of East Timor) since.

Even before president Habibie's surprise call for a referendum this year, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its control over
East Timor's resources, and undertook careful planning with "the aim, quite simply... to destroy a nation".

The plans were known to western intelligence. The army recruited thousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More ominously, the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained Kopassus special forces and, as senior military adviser, General Makarim, a US-trained intelligence specialist with "a reputation for callous violence".

Terror and destruction began early in the year. The army forces responsible have been described as "rogue elements" in the west. There is good reason, however, to accept Bishop Belo's assignment of direct responsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the militias have been managed by elite units of Kopassus, the "crack special forces unit" that had "been training regularly with US and Australian forces until their behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends".

These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix programme in the
Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of peasants and much of the indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as "the tactics employed by the Contras" in Nicaragua. The state terrorists were "not simply going after the most radical pro-independence people, but... the moderates, the people who have influence in their community."

Well before the referendum, the commander of the Indonesian military in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to come: "If the pro- independents do win... all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23 years ago". An army document of early May, when international agreement on the referendum was reached, ordered "massacres should be carried out from village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro- independence supporters win". The independence movement "should be eliminated from its leadership down to its roots".

Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources, the Australian press reported that "hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars are being stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is rejected at the ballot box".

All of this was understood by Indonesia's "foreign friends", who also knew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and ambiguous reactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret as a "green light" to carry out their work.

The sordid history must be viewed against the background of US-
Indonesia relations in the postwar era. The rich resources of the archipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed it a central role in US global planning. These factors lie behind US efforts 40 years ago to dismantle Indonesia, perceived as too independent and too democratic
- even permitting participation of the poor peasants. These factors account for western support for the regime of killers and torturers who emerged from the 1965 coup.

Their achievements were seen as a vindication of Washington's wars in
Indochina, motivated in large part by concerns that the "virus" of independent nationalism might "infect" Indonesia, to use Kissinger-like rhetoric.

The recent convulsions inside Indonesia - with its people finally crying for freedom and democracy - and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1996 - shared between Bishop Belo, a dominican supporting the Maubere people in
Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, a politician and activist who represents the
Resistance historic leader, Xanana Gusmao, imprisioned in Indonesia for a
20-year sentence - have brought a new hope to the fight of this martyr people. Also, economic crisis hitting south-east Asia has shaken the dictatorship in Jakarta more than ever. The winds of change blowing throughout Indonesia started to hit East Timor...

Introduction to Indonesia

Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the world which means 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part of the declared Muslims mix their faith in Allah with animistic or Hindu-
Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the Indian colonization that would be interrupted with the penetration of Islam in the 16th century, generally superficial and incomplete.

Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677 islands, 3 000 inhabited, and with an approximate extension of 1/8 the perimeter of Earth,
Indonesia faces problems of national unity. Being the fifth most populous nation, 2/3 are concentrated in only the fifth larger island, Java, where the density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably by birth control and transmigration to territories such as Papua New Guinea, recently East Timor but also in between with the evident purpose of dissolving local cultures in the predominant Javanese which is only one amongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different languages and dialects.

The Dutch colonial domain had been massively based in Java, with the rest of the archipelago had developed very unequally. From the rigid
Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes of Borneo or the Christian islands of the east, a variety of economic and social systems experienced very distinct problems for their progress.

Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno

At the time of Indonesia's proclamation of independence in 1945,
President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state -- the "Panca sila" (meaning "five virtues") -- to be followed by all citizens and sworn by the social organizations. Main principles imposed were the adoption of
Indonesian "Bahasa" language and the acceptance of one among five religions
-- Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism -- forbidding the animist cults and other traditional practices. Thus "Panca sila" was assumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize the diverse cultures.

But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibility of the creation of an official Islamic state, when Suharto reached to power, Communist administrators and Islamic movements supported the
Revolution, but what they didn't expect was the minor concessions offered, and once annihilated the Communist Party, an “important preoccupation of the government has been to control, domesticate or destroy the most orthodox and active Muslim factions” (Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhгes, Oporto
University). Since then they oftenly erupt in riots against the military aristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.

Besides reaffirming the "Panca sila", in 1982 Suharto introduced the
Law of the Associations which would fasten the strain on political, religious and social associations as it increased the powers of the administration to dismiss or impute directors to the aggregations, to destroy or agglutinate them in others more vast and controlled by the militaries.

Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections in favor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with the killing of 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of former governors that defied an inquiry to the incident.

Neo-colonialism in Indonesia? Many authors mention that Sukarno had a dream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising the totality of the ancient Dutch East Indies, inclusive the non-Indonesian population. For this reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially conceived for the creation of the United States of Indonesia -- thus betraying the agreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty --, in favor of an unitary constitution, although still provisional. The new direction was taken in August of 1950, three months after an unilateral declaration of independence by the South Moluccas.

The first elections, free and democratic in fact, would be held in
1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences naturally brought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. On one hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of the "Nahdatul
Ulama" (NU) and the orthodox Moslems of the "Masyumi", which's vital strength came from the outside -- West Sumatra and North Celebes besides
Occidental Java (Sundanese ethnic origin). On the other hand, between the
Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based in Java, and these with the Moslems.

The inefficiency of the administration, which passed through seven governments since 1949 to '57, and the rivalry engaged by the parties alone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th, after all, the concentration of decision and power in Java as restrictor of the economic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in the exterior islands.

In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal democracy because unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He interfered more in the constitutional processes and appeals to his concept of "Guided Democracy", founded on indigenous procedures: the important questions should be decided through prolonged deliberations ("musyawarah") in order to obtain consensus
("mukafat"). This was the practice in the village and the same model ought to be adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government formed by the four main parties and a national council represented by parties and functional groups in which, under the guidance of the president (himself), consensus would express itself.

In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father of the country and mentor of the principle "unity in diversity", he was unable to avoid the proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response to the regional dissidences which reached their peak.

At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat of a motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West New
Guinea. In a series of direct actions across the country, Dutch property was seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the beginning of
1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new central government under the leadership of Hatta, a moderate and historic figure of the
Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years ago when he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal of the Sumatrese a new revolutionary government was formed, supported by leaders of the Masyumi Party, including the ex-Prime Ministers Natsir
(September 1950 -- March '51) and Harahap (August '55 -- March '56). The military commandant of the North Celebes joined the initiative, yet most striking was CIA's assistance with armament including aircrafts.

Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and with the regions undermined, the parties discredited and the prestige of the victorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of Guided Democracy in partnership with the military. Meanwhile, the army chief of staff A.
Nasution had committed himself to the thought that the return to the revolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the best means for implementing the principles of deliberation, consensus and functional representation. Sukarno urged this course in a speech to the
Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution.
Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds for majority, he introduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.

Indonesia's domestic as well as foreign diplomacy is difficult to conceive in terms other than in the context of neo-colonialism. It certainly is incompatible with the spirit of the Afro-Asian Conference of
Bandung held in Java, in 1955. Among twenty nine countries consensus was reached in order to condemn colonialism “in all it's forms of manifestation”. As it seems, imperialism isn't condemnable so long the territories comes from an ancient colony. Like the annexation of the
Moluccan islands (1950-52) and in 1969 the also former Dutch West New
Guinea, long pretended. The last was integrated after an Act of Free Choice sanctioned by UN. In truth, many journalists and observers would consider the process orchestrated but it had already been sealed. Today it is remembered as perhaps the most unfortunate episode UN's history.

In both regions, as well as in other islands of the Pacific, population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not identifying themselves with
Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.

The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From the perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in the district of Acheh, a Moslem state practically subsisted between 1948 and
1962), Sumatra and Celebes as we've seen but also Kalimantan, to those involving Christian groups as in the South Moluccas. Still in 1984 the
Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in attacks against the main cities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to the
Regional Parliament.

The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the preservation of the equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI). The period assisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the consistent protection moved by the President in face of the incursions of the militaries. he opposed to the prohibitions of congresses and editorials, banished political organizations patronized by the military to blacken the
PKI, placing some of their militants in political posts. Many analysts think that Sukarno was preparing the path for the rise of the communists to the power. Others say that his action intended to assure a the permanently threatened equilibrium

The coup of Suharto and the military. On the night of September 30,
1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim Air Base attempted a coup d'йtat to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over of a pro-
Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic Reserve of the Army Forces (KOSTRAD), commanded by Suharto, had concluded a successful counter-attack. For specialist Benedict Anderson, of Cornell
University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins of power into his hands, hadn't been aimed at by the "30th of September Movement" which assassinated six army generals (while a seventh, A. Nasution, escaped).

With propaganda that implicated important nationalist and communist politicians in the first stroke and the estimulation of the widely spread resentment of the pro-Chinese PKI was object of among the Indonesian
Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed power. Suharto begun to maintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional presidency, as a symbol of national unity until by decree emptying his legal authority, in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for more than half a million Chinese and Indonesian besides an excess of 200 thousand political prisoners which altogether formed one of the greatest Communist parties of the World. The wave of hysteria was such that they were pointed out and oftenly even executed by their proper neighbor civilians in the villages.

Formation of East-Timorese political associations

During Portuguese dictatorship, civilians were prohibited to gather for political discussions. But since the 60's an educated elite with nationalist aspirations begun to reune clandistinely and vehicle some principles in catholic press. Three weeks after the democratic Revolution, formation of political associations was incentivated, in the process of decolonization. Immediatly UDT was founded, wanting to prolong Portugal's presence in view of a progressive autonomy. ASDT, future Fretilin, called for radical independence, while Apodeti, supported by Indonesia, for the integration of East Timor in the neighbour power.

Although the changes acrossing the metropolis were of little immediate effect in the rural society, they had profound impact among the elites of
East Timor, particularly in the administrator sectors, centered in the cities and specially in Dili They polarized the opposition to certain aspects of the Portuguese rule.

Since the 60s, an educated elite with nationalist aspirations began to emerge, often product of the catholic schools and particularly from the seminaries of Dare (outside Dili) and S. Jose in the colony of Macao.
Discussions involved small groups of students and administrators that gathered clandestinely in the capital. The main escapes of their ideas were catholic publications of reduced circulation like Seara, which was closed down by the political police PIDE.

The conclusions reached are considered general and vagrant. Subjects like traditional marriage and the educational system were debated but not much was proposed as a global critic and alternatives.

Anyhow, this collective of student-administrators and higher level bureaucrats, as well as important rural proprietors would constitute the basis of the two main political parties: UDT and ASDT/Fretilin.

Three weeks after the Revolution 25th of April, the Governor of East
Timor created the Commission for the Autodetermination which's intentions were to bring out to legality all the incipient political associations.

The parties

UDT (Timor Democratic Union). This became the first party, was also the most popular for some months. The initial declaration, of May 11th, made apology of democratic principles, distribution of revenues and, the fulcral aspect, a progressive autonomy materialized with an increasing participation of the Timorese but always in the light of the Portuguese flag, to culminate with the integration of East Timor in a Portuguese language community. The political platform as conceived by first president
Mбrio Carrascalгo was to hold Portugal's presence as far as possible without putting aside the option for independence. But although having presented a cohesive front at start, the course of events in the months followed would evidence different susceptibilities towards a same problem.

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