East Timor Independence
p> Firmly based on two groups, the higher positioned administrator elite
and the larger proprietors of coffee plantations. UDT accounted still the
favours of many suco liurais, although the majority of these belonged to
the circle of the imposed chiefs, in an ancient practice of the colonial
government to substitute the legitimate when less malleable... They used
their influence to gain support for the party in the countryside managing
strong implantation in areas like Liquie, Maubara, Maubisse, Ainaro,
Manatuto, Laclubar. While a group of conservatives were granted support by traditional
chiefs and administrators -- whose positions and privileges under
Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the metropolis --,
those with commercial preoccupations of economical diversification beyond
the Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence. Not until 27 of July did the MFA in Lisbon determine the new
orientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it, the Timorese
were officially and for the first time confronted with the possibility of
independence. In a message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about the
viability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained. Few days
later, UDT published the provisional statutes where preconized
autodetermination oriented to federation with Portugal, with an
intermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting integration
in any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement of
a definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of independence
that blew from the ancient metropolis. Spreading throughout the African
colonies, in East Timor it influenced a crescent opposing party of
independist militancy that defied UDT's hesitations: ASDT. Amongst UDT founders pontificated the mentioned Mario Carrascalгo,
proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services, and
also former leader of caetanist party ANP (Popular National Association),
the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP member and
director of Timor's journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by the government.
He and intellectual Domingos de Oliveira were custom officials. Cesar
Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili. ASDT/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). The
plan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it's foundation, 20th of
May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and democracy it called upfront
for a gradual independence preceded of administrator, economical, social
and political reforms. Three to eight years was the period of transition
considered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation of the
Timorese in the administration. In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members of
the urbane elites, mainly those living in Dнli, which maintained the link
to the rural areas of where they came from. Some were even descendants of
liurai families. With an average age under 30, the elder Xavier do Amaral, of 37,
became ASDT's chairman. The leaders were commited to nationalism and
reaffirmation of the Timorese culture, agreed on the priority of
agricultural development, on alphabetization and extensive health
programmes. But furthermore, the political perspectives deferred. The
dominating tendency between the founders of ASDT was clearly social-
democratic, represented by men like journalist Ramos-Horta, administrator
Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota and former professor Xavier do Amaral.
Ramos-Horta says that for him and the majority of his colleagues it
represented social justice, equitative distribution of the country's
wealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended democratic
liberties. As to what extent did they have a model, sociologist John G.
Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the 60 and 70's in Austria and
Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn't experimented, as the urgency to gain internal
and foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity. Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current leaded by ancient
sergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, “combined a
fervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of economical and political
development self-reliance based upon the experiences of Angola and
Mozambique”. His ideas would begin to prevail after the transformation of
ASDT into FRETILIN. Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). In 25 of May a
third party appeared under the designation of Association for the
Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti, the manifesto of the
party defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia in
accordance to the International Law and principles such as the obligatory
teaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education and
medical assistance, and the right to go on strike. The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the assumption that Portugal
would abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn't stand a
chance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in a
process of integration appeared more as a popular measure and than as a
political stand. It has been written that in the beginning of the 60's, BAKIN (military
co-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence INTEL), mounted a net in
East Timor which dealed with merchants, custom-house functionaries and
agents from the Indonesian consulate of Dili, in change of favours,
payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would become
the prominent leaders of Apodeti: professor and administrator Osуrio
Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of Indonesian Timor) Guilherme
Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo. Still before the Portuguese Revolution, BAKIN had trained East-
timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters. Nevertheless, while UDT and ASDT/Fretilin rapidly reached to the
thousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn't reach more than a couple of hundreds
during the whole year of '74. The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small
Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had no expression. The dubious
personalities of it's leaders, all with criminal record and their political
purposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor's last governor, J. Lemos
Pires “an enclosed organization, with difficulties to dialogue with the
people and government even worse with the opponent parties”. Fretilin
considered Apodeti illegal. Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA
(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning "sons of the mountain warriors", was
filiated in the Popular Monarchical Party of the metropolis. Remounting
it's origins to the Topasses (see Ethnology of the Timorese), KOTA
postulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who could trace their
ancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a democratic
monarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais. Like KOTA, the
Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn't a programme and agrouped only
eight members, all from the same family. They wished to mobilize the
working class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East Timor
in Australia received money for promises of integration in Australia. It's
existence was ephemerous because the Australian government departed from
the idea even before the end of 1974. Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned and
precisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke that
four of the five parties, which they alleged that was the majority of the
East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War On 15 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously
authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Timor (UNSCR
1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for its mandate: first,
to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect and support
the United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third, to facilitate within
force capabilities humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor. The
multinational force is commanded by Australia’s Major General Peter
Cosgrove Australian support The multinational force has been authorised by the United Nations
Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to use
all necessary measures to achieve its mandate. The multinational force
would prepare the ground for the United Nations to complete its task of
managing East Timor's transition to independence. This will involve the
arrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet UN peacekeeping
operation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration. Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new –
Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But the East Timor operation –
multilateral in scope, strongly representing South East Asia, led by
Australia and conducted under a United Nations Chapter VII or peace
enforcement mandate – is of a very different nature. This is the first time
that Australia has been asked by the United Nations to build and lead a
multinational force and to provide the largest single component. When
Australia’s deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops. Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is not motivated by
any desire to cause difficulties in relations between Australia and
Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor at the request
of the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian Government.
It was in Australia’s vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stable
and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and
respected role in the region. It was also in Indonesia’s own interests to
ensure East Timor’s transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australia’s
efforts in building the relations with Indonesia were directed to that
outcome. With respect to defence relations, it is in australian security
interests to have links such as defence attache representation, high-level
strategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance and disaster
relief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the objectives in
East Timor, and are desirable because defence links will be part of any
effective long-term relationship with Indonesia. That decision shows the
challenges Jakarta and Canberra face in maintaining a working defence
relationship that supports the long-term national and strategic interests
of both countries. Prime Minister Howard has said that “the deployment of Australian
troops to East Timor meets the test of national interest in two respects.
First, in the spirit of Australia's military tradition, troops are going to
defend what Australian society believes to be right. The troops are not
going to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others or to
act against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go to
East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement of
the Indonesian government. INTERFET troops are defending East Timor’s
desire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by the
Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international community.
In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the humanitarian relief that
is so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of displaced people
in East Timor. Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to the
terrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the ballot
was announced. Apart from the human cost, the scale of violence we
witnessed undermines Australia's own interest in a stable region. The
troops will prepare the way for the United Nations to undertake the vital
task of developing a transitional political and administrative framework
for East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the hope of reconciliation
among groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity to
create their own future. They have a responsibility to come to grips with
these issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate on
its nation building task, with the full support of the international
community.” USA admits Timorese right to self-determination On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold, dated December 27th, 1996,
U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that he "noted
with interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of a UN-sponsored
self-determination referendum in East Timor". Indonesia admits independence For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted the right of
the Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another high-
level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese and Indonesian
Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations' headquarters in New Yourk, the
Indonesian authorities stated that if the East Timorese rejected the
current authonomy plan offered by Indonesia, the central government in
Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors. Only a couple of weeks later, president B.J. Habibie announced, at a
meeting with indonesian businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce, that by
January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would be 'fixed': either the
Timorese accepted the "large-scale authonomy" proposed by the Indonesian
government in New York (August 5th, 1998), or Indonesia "would wave them
goodbye". It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked of
independence for East Timor. Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has worsened in the last
months, followin the alleged massacre at Alas (south of Dili) last
December, when as much as 52 people would have been killed. The military
(18,000 soldiers currently serve in the occupied territory, according to
intelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident officer - that
is, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in the
rest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what international
observers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on the verge
of Indonesia's leave. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General Assembly
resolutions and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;
bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and
Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-
General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable
solution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5 August
1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General,
negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East
Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective
Governments on the final status of East Timor; having discussed a
constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a
draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian
Government; noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the
proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to
the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty
over East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an
autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from
the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending
a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people
through an act of self-determination under United Notions auspices; taking
into account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each
have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special
autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process
forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal
agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on
the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;
bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested
the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular
consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in New
York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the Agreement Between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor “Article 1 Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor
within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both
inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or
rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret
and universal ballot. Article 2 Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the
signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East
Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation. Article 3 The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining
peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular
consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere
free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side. Article 4 Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popular
consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as
to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timorese
people. Article 5 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result
of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that,
the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to
the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate the
constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the
constitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiate
within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East
Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General
Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of
the Security Council and the General Assembly. Article 6 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result
of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the
proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to
the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the
constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus
restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July
1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-
General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of
authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall,
subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure
enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence. Article 7 During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular
consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the
parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United
Nations presence in East Timor. “ Conclusion On August, 30th, History was written in East Timor: 98.6% of
registered voters exercised their democratic right in a UN-organised
referendum, considered by the Indonesian authorities as "free and fair".
Defying eight months of intimidation by indonesian-armed militiamen, mostly
transmigrated from West Timor, the population stood in long queues at the
ballot sites, in some cases waiting hours in the sun after walking
kilometres to the nearest polling station. Hardly anybody partied in Dili, though, or in the rest of the
territory; celebrations were held abroad, though, in Australia, Portugal,
the United States, Ireland, England, Mozambique, even Indonesia, wherever a
Timorese community is to be found. But inside the new Nation, just four
hours after the official announcement, the defeated militia gangs started
to set East Timor on fire. BBC, CNN, and other international TV stations
broadcasted to the world images once seen in other war scenarios - fire of
automatic weapons, houses set on fire, innocent civilians seeking shelter
in the schools, the churches, the neighbouring mountains. International
media reports mentioned 145 deaths in Dili only, in the 48 hours following
the announcement. On September, 5th and 6th, most international observers,
journalists and the civilian personnel of UNAMET were evacuated from the
territory, either by chartered planes or the Australian Air Force. On the
afternoon of September, the 5th, four indonesian ministers - including
Defence and Foreign Affairs holders, General Wiranto and Mr. Ali Alatas -
and one secretary of State paid a 4-hour visit to Dili - though they never
left the airport "for security reasons". On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered on
an emergency meeting in New York, once more abstained from sending in a
peace-keeping force. The Indonesian authorities claimed to be able to
restore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already stationed in the
territory failed to do so until now, and were even reported to have
participated, in some cases directly, in the new mass killings started on
September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence from UNAMET staff and
international media wasn't enough, so the Council decided to send a "fact-
finding mission" to Jakarta. On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of Nobel Peace Prize
winner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in Baucau,
though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees in his frontyard,
now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like so many before them.
More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili, and
the UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport. Despite several United Nations Resolutions on the right of the
Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized the indonesian
annexation of the territory), the international community has been blind to
the fight of its inhabitants. Only since November 12th, 1991, when more
than 250 youngsters were killed during a brutal massacre occurred in a
cematery in Dili (the capital city of East Timor), have the "civilized"
nations condemned Indonesia in a more consistent way. But words of
condemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime (a
dictatorship ruling Indonesia for decades), and strengthen the economic
ties binding European and American states to Jakarta. The five days which mediated until official results were announced
were days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other spots
in the territory. But on the morning of September, 4th, UNAMET (United
Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian Martin announced the
results, minutes after the United Nations' Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,
had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept the
Special Autonomy offered to the territory by Indonesia, while an
overwhelming majority of 78.5% reffused it, thus laying the path to
independence. The sources . Aditjondro, George J In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the
Occupation of East Timor, The Netherlands, 1994 . Aubrey, Jim Free East Timor – Australia’s Culpability in East Timor’s Genocide. Vintage – Random House Australia . Carey, P & GC Bentley East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a Nation, Cassell, NY, 1995 . CIIR/IPJET International Law and the Question of East Timor, London, 1995 . Cox, Steve Generations of Resistance: East Timor, Cassell, UK, 1995
. Dunn, James 1. East Timor - the Balibo Incident in Perspective, Sydney, 1995 . Timor: A People Betrayed , ABC Books, Sydney, 1996 . East Timor: No Solutions Without respect for Human Rights: Bi-Annual Report of Human Rights Violations, January to June 1998 . Violence by the State Against Women in East Timor: A Report to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Including its Clauses and Consequences . East Timorese Political Prisoners . Breaking the Cycle of Human Rights Violations in East Timor: Annual Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1997 . Hobart East Timor Committee Hobart East Timor Committee – Papers, 1998 Jardine, Matthew . Ramos Horta, Jose, International Perspectives on Children of War, Family and Conciliation Courts Review Vol 36 No 3 July 1998 . Salla, Michael E, Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 1997 . ETAN/US - Pamphlets/Reports NY,USA . Indonesia and East Timor: On the verge of change? Charles Scheiner, Matthew Jardine & Sidhawati ETAN, Global Exchange & Justice for All, April 1998
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